Vol. 5 No. 1 (2025): Elegest Elegeş
Makaleler

The role of information economics and communication channels in the real estate market

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  • Hamza Özçiftçi,
  • Fettah Turan,
  • Özlem Gönül
Hamza Özçiftçi
İstanbul University-Cerrahpaşa, Vocational School of Social Sciences
Bio
Fettah Turan
İstanbul University-Cerrahpaşa, Vocational School of Social Sciences
Özlem Gönül
Yeni Yüzyıl University

Published 31.03.2025

Keywords

  • Real estate market,
  • Information asymmetry,
  • Communication channels
  • Gayrimenkul piyasası,
  • Bilgi asimetrisi,
  • İletişim kanalları

How to Cite

The role of information economics and communication channels in the real estate market. (2025). Elegest Elegeş, 5(1), 48-63. https://doi.org/10.64360/vnt62w38

Copyright (c) 2025 Hamza Özçiftçi- Fettah Turan- Özlem Gönül (Yazar)

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

The role of information economics and communication channels in the real estate market. (2025). Elegest Elegeş, 5(1), 48-63. https://doi.org/10.64360/vnt62w38

Abstract

In this study, the role of information asymmetry and communication channels in the real estate market was examined. The findings revealed that incomplete or misleading information during valuation processes fostered price fluctuations and speculative activities. Both traditional intermediaries and digital platforms significantly influenced investor confidence, increasing the risk of market instability. A literature review approach highlighted the potential of open data policies, blockchain technology, and AI-powered valuation systems to reduce information asymmetry. The conclusions emphasized the necessity of digitizing land registers, promoting independent appraisals and enhancing financial literacy to strengthen market transparency.

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